The Sense of a Beginning is the first comprehensive exploration of the openings of novels. With a title that deliberately echoes Frank Kermode's famous book on endings, the book addresses the formal challenge of opening lines, especially in modernism, and illustrates their significance to both literary creation and literary criticism. Niels Buch Leander's approach is wide-ranging, examining how beginnings in fiction relate to beginnings in nature, how they work from a formal and narrative point of view, how modernist (...) self-awareness plays out in openings, and how openings have altered criticism itself through intertextuality. Drawing on examples from D. H. Lawrence, Thomas Mann, Paul Valery, and more, as well as appraisals by critics like Roland Barthes and Edward Said, Leander fills a truly surprising gap in literary scholarship. (shrink)

The main objectives of the bibliography are to incorporate women's publications into the main body of philosophical thought, to increase the visibility and use of publications created by women, and to indicate the variety of approaches, concepts, and theories embodied in these works. Women Philosophers brings together women's works, ideas, and theories from all branches of philosophy and compiles them into a comprehensive bibliography. More than 2,800 monographs, series, and volumes written or edited by women are listed. An author index (...) with more than 1,900 names is also included. (shrink)

As negative information about companies becomes widely available and spreads rapidly through digital communications, understanding consumer reactions to these events and how human perceptions are shaped becomes increasingly important. In this paper, we investigate how consumers’ identification with brands and their love for them affect their support for the brand during extremely unethical situations. The results indicate that brand identification both decreases and increases consumers’ ethical judgment following extremely unethical events. Moreover, we find that consumers who are in a love (...) type relationship with the brand proactively shield the brand from other consumers by employing two brand supportive behaviors; sin of omission and brand defense. (shrink)

Alles, was der Mensch von sich wissen kann, lässt sich an den Werkzeugen und Medien ablesen, die er gebraucht. Diese These steht im Mittelpunkt des Werks von Ernst Kapp (1808-1896), Gymnasiallehrer für Geschichte und Erdkunde, Technikphilosoph und Farmer in Texas. Obwohl Ernst Kapp unbestritten als Begründer der modernen Technikphilosophie gilt, ist sein anthropologischer Ansatz bislang kaum systematisch rezipiert worden. Zwar wird sein Werk in Überblicken meist als wichtiger Ausgangspunkt für die Technikphilosophie des 20. Jahrhunderts genannt, sein heuristisches Theorem der Organprojektion (...) wird dabei jedoch oft falsch als Vorläufer der Prothesentheorie von Freud bis McLuhan eingeordnet und nicht als kulturhistorische Erkenntnistheorie verstanden. Bei dem vorliegenden Buch handelt es sich um den ersten Forschungsband zum Werk von Ernst Kapp. Mit Beiträgen von Suzana Alpsancar, Christine Blättler, Lorenz Engell, Volker Gerhardt, Frank Hartmann, Christoph Hubig, Friedrich A. Kittler, Harun Maye, Alfred Nordmann, Birgit Recki, Hans-Martin Sass, Leander Scholz, Johanna Seifert, Christiane Voss und Niels Werber"--Back cover. (shrink)

In this paper, I present a new (i.e., previously overlooked) breed of exercitive speech act (the conversational exercitive). I establish that any conversational contribution that invokes a rule of accommodation changes the bounds of conversational permissibility and is therefore an (indirect) exercitive speech act. Such utterances enact permissibility facts without expressing the content of such facts, without the speaker intending to be enacting such facts and without the hearer recognizing that it is so. Because of the peculiar nature ofthe rules (...) of accommodation that generate them, conversational exercitives have importantly different felicity conditions and therefore constitute a new breed ofexercitive speech act. (shrink)

Think of the sublime: images come to mind first. Images of mountains, oceans, deserts, and other wild natural sites. Images of pyramids, cathedrals, skyscrapers, and other colossal cultural artifacts. Most of these mental images are probably still and silent, very much like photos. They might also portray dynamic situations, like big waves breaking on a rocky shore, or high trees moved by a thunderous storm, or the wind howling across the ruins of an ancient temple. Yet these scenes are likely (...) to be imagined as sublime independently of their inner temporality, perhaps as animated still pictures like GIFs or “live” smartphone photos.But maybe something else comes to your mind. If you are a classical music lover, you... (shrink)

To the person unfamiliar with the wide variety of street art, the term “street artist” conjures a young man furtively sneaking around a decaying city block at night, spray paint in hand, defacing concrete structures, ears pricked for police sirens. The possibility of the ethical criticism of street art on such a conception seems hardly worth the time. This has to be an easy question. Street art is vandalism; vandalism is causing the intentional damage or destruction of someone else’s (...) property; causing destruction or damage is wrong. The only remaining question is which of two coarse-grained models of ethical criticism we choose. The ethicist model holds that a work of art that exhibits ethically bad properties is a work that is thereby aesthetically flawed. That is, the work is flawed as a work of art just because of its ethical flaws. Bad ethics make art worse than it otherwise would have been, although it may be aesthetically successful otherwise. The autonomist model, by contrast, holds that the ethical properties of a work of art have no bearing at all on its aesthetic success. One might suppose, therefore, that on either model, a criticism of street art would be relatively easy to undertake. In defacing public property, some street art exhibits and endorses ethically bad attitudes. On the ethicist model, such a work is thereby pro tanto aesthetically flawed because in the process of creating such works, they violate ethical norms concerning the use of public spaces; on the autonomous model, any ethical criticism of the aesthetics of street art would need to be set aside entirely in favor of criticism that focused purely on the aesthetic properties of street art. I will argue in this paper that neither the ethicist nor the autonomist model adequately captures the moral landscape of street art. Street art may indeed be criticized productively on aesthetic grounds for the destruction it does to public spaces, but the existing models of ethical criticism overlook the complex ethical landscape of street art that results from its use of public spaces. In the interplay of various forms of street art we can see the emergence of an ethical criticism of art that is accomplished by the material properties of related artwork, and consists in the creation of a dialogue over the proper use of contested public spaces. (shrink)

Philosophers involved in the ‘porn-or-art’ debates standardly assume that pornography is centrally about sexual arousal, while art is about something else. I argue against this assumption and for the view that there is no single thing that pornography (or art) ‘is about’. This suggests that there is no prima facie reason for claiming that some x cannot be both pornography and art. I further go on to develop an understanding of (what I call) ‘porno-art’ - a wholly new kind (...) of thing developing from the extant categories of pornography and art, but still distinct and separate from them. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:A Pantheology of Pandemic: Sex, Race, Nature, and The VirusMary-Jane Rubenstein (bio)I. PunitheologyThe explanations started pouring in even before the virus attained “pandemic” status in March of 2020: we were being punished. According to a vocal subset of Evangelical pastors and ultra-Orthodox rabbis, the death-dealing virus was divine retribution for the sins of (who else?) LGBT-identified people and their allies, who aggressively violated what the pastors and rabbis (...) called “the order of nature.”1 Meanwhile, their left-leaning counterparts argued that the sin in question wasn’t so much sexual as ecological: in the words of one Roman Catholic commentator, the coronavirus was God’s punishment for “our unfettered domination attitude toward nature.”2At the same time, an equally vocal throng of secular environmentalists called the virus nature’s own punishment for our manifold violations against her—in particular, the extractivism, pollution, alleged overpopulation, deforestation, carbon emissions, and industrial slaughterhouses that allowed the zoonotic strain to break out among humans in the first place.3 Depending on whom [End Page 5] you ask, then, the disaster we’ve come to encapsulate as COVID-19 is either godly or natural retribution for our manifold sins against “nature.”Although these sacred and secular punitheologies are not equivalent, they bear striking similarities to one another thanks to the monotheistic heritage of the concept of “nature” itself. As we will see, whether it is invoked by pastors, politicians, activists, or scientists, “nature” in the Western-descended world is presented as singular, nonwhite, and feminine; morally normative; and prone to abuse. Nature is often capitalized, often maternalized, and reliably distinguished either from a disembodied male God, a universalized “humanity,” or both. Nature, in short, carries immense ideological freight. Specifically, it installs and polices the work of what Kelly Brown Douglas calls “theo-ideology”: a “sacred legitimation” for a social order that seeks to present itself as unquestionable.4 And “nature” does this unparalleled ideological work thanks to the freedom it keeps promising from ideology: “your” way of being might be constructed, distorted, historical, subjective, contingent, artificial, cultural, or indeed sinful, but “ours” is natural—which is to say universally, even transcendently, true.Whether it comes from the mouths of angry clerics or righteous ecologists, then, the call to get right with nature is a call to adhere to one or another self-concealing social arrangement—to a set of interests and values whose power derives from its seeming so “natural.” For this reason, many contemporary thinkers recommend abandoning the term altogether. Donna Haraway suggests we try the non-binary and carefully pluralized “naturecultures”; Bruno Latour proposes “critical zones,” and Timothy Morton pivots to ecological practice which, he insists, can only function if we let go of the romantic delusion of “nature.”5Regardless of nature’s conceptual integrity, it is important to attend to the term in order to account for its rhetorical force and ubiquity—for the polyphibious presence of “nature” within the left and right-wings of science, religion, and politics alike. In this article, I will decode some of the recent, theologically [End Page 6] retributive appeals to nature within early, informal, literary responses to the COVID-19 outbreak in the US. In the process, I hope to unearth some of the mythic norms of race and gender that this concept both entrenches and conceals in the American imagination. Finally, I will ask what happens when we start messing with these categories, beginning with the mirroring chasms between humans and nature, and nature and God. How might we start to think pantheologically about this unrelenting pandemic, and why would anybody want to?II. Sins against NatureAs Catherine Keller noticed as early as April 2020, American pundits across the political spectrum immediately attributed COVID-19 to the relentless justice of an angry God.6 It is perhaps America’s favorite theological maneuver: explaining natural and social disasters as the product of divine vengeance. From Jonathan Edwards’s spider to Fred Phelps’s funeral protests, American preachers and political commentators have got a long-standing knack for putting the fear of God into a suffering nation. (Even my home insurance policy washes its hands of... (shrink)

This essay is a reflection of the time I have spent working with Cardinal Newman’s archive at the Birmingham Oratory. I have had a chance to stop and carefully read his letters and diaries and to see Newman as a communicator extraordinaire! I suspect that the Cardinal would have had great command of today’s social media and communications technology. His laity could have been a wider and larger audience on a virtual level. Might this be an opportunity for a sociological (...) comparison of the great writers and speakers of an earlier time with those of us in today’s media-rich world? With whom else might Newman have interacted? We may never know with certainty, but it would be fun to imagine. (shrink)

From certain sorts of premise, individuals reliably infer invalid conclusions. Two Experiments investigated a possible cause for these illusory inference: Reasoners fail to think about what is false. In Experiment 1, 24 undergraduates drew illusory and control inferences from premises based on exclusive disjunctions (“or else”). In one block, participants were instructed to falsify the premises of each illusory and control inference before making the inference. In the other block, participants did not receive these instructions. There were more correct (...) answers for illusory disjunctions whose premises had been falsified than there were for illusory disjunctions that had not been falsified. A second Experiment introduced illusory inferences in a real world context that accentuated falsification of premises. Accuracy also improved. Knowledge of how to falsify premises and to consider their implications for true premises transferred to a new problem introduced at the end of the Experiment without the falsification instruction. The participants' ratings of the difficulty of the inferences showed that they did not err simply because illusory inferences are perceived to be more difficult than control problems. The model theory predicts these results because it postulates that the limitations of working memory preclude the representation of false information. (shrink)

1. Conceptions of the nature of value are of two main types: they are either objective, or realistic, or else subjective, that is, psychological. The immediately following pages are devoted to the critical consideration of the first of these, the realistic conception of value as “an indefinable quality which attaches to things independently of consciousness.” According to this view, things have value as they have form or colour or volume. A rose, for example, has the qualities of redness, of (...) fragrance, and also of beauty; a book has the qualities of rectangularity, of twelve-ounce weight, and also of truth; a negro has the qualities of erectness, of brownness, and also of moral goodness or badness. Beauty, truth, and moral goodness, grouped together as ‘values,’ or ‘worths,’ or ‘goods,’ are from this point of view as indefinable and ‘absolute’ as the primary and secondary qualities: indeed, they are together known as “tertiary qualities.’ In G. E. Moore's words, a value or “ ‘good’ is a simple notion, just as ‘yellow’ is a simple notion”; and “just as you cannot, by any manner of means, explain to anyone who does not already know it what yellow is, so you cannot explain what good is.”. (shrink)

We often say one thing and mean another. This kind of indirection (concerning the content conveyed) is both ubiquitous and widely recognized. Other forms of indirection, however, are less common and less discussed. For example, we can sometimes address one person with the primary intention of being overheard by someone else. And, sometimes speakers say something simply in order to make it possible for someone else to say that they said it. Politicians generating sounds bites for the media (...) are an example of this kind of indirection. In this paper, I will explore—via a series of fictionalized examples—these less discussed forms of indirection and consider how such forms of indirection can be duplicitous and misleading. (shrink)

It is in the interest of the totalitarian state that subjects not think for themselves, much less confer about their thinking. Writing under the hostile watch of the Prussian censorship, Immanuel Kant dared to argue the need for open argument, in the university if nowhere else. In this heroic criticism of repression, first published in 1798, he anticipated the crises that endanger the free expression of ideas in the name of national policy. Composed of three sections written at different (...) times, The Conflict of the Faculties dwells on the eternal combat between the "lower" faculty of philosophy, which is answerable only to individual reason, and the faculties of theology, law, and medicine, which get "higher" precedence in the world of affairs and whose teachings and practices are of interest to the government. Kant makes clear, for example, the close alliance between the theological faculty and the government that sanctions its teachings and can resort to force and censorship. All the more vital and precious, then, the faculty of philosophy, which encourages independent thought before action. The first section, "The Conflict of the Philosophy Faculty with the Theology Faculty," is essentially a vindication of the right of the philosophical faculty to freedom of expression. In the other sections the philosopher takes a long and penetrating look at medicine and law, the one preserving the physical "temple" and the other regulating its actions. (shrink)

This article provides some historical perspectives on parental investment and childbearing. Scholars are debating whether parents always loved and nurtured their children. The historical record provides some support for both sides. Parents who abandoned their children often did so with the hope that someone else would be able to raise them. But others, like the ancient Carthagians, sacrificed their own children to appease the gods. Colonial Americans appear to have been particularly solicitous of the well-being of their children. The (...) paper then traces the changes in the role of women in facilitating the process of childbirth in America. Scholars are cautioned not to idealize the childbirth experiences of women in the past as they experienced considerable pain and fear. (shrink)

My topic may seem a bizarre mixture of epistemology and value theory; and perhaps it is best to acknowledge this oddity at once. I should also, perhaps, confess that such a mixture has always seemed something to aspire to. Any philosopher who has made it seem that feeling strongly about something, valuing it highly, is an inevitable consequence of the nature of human understanding , that from the facts of knowledge or perception one can derive the inescapable facts of emotion (...) or desire, any such philosopher has always deeply appealed to me. I am therefore a confessed perpetrator of the naturalistic fallacy. Indeed I go further, and say that I love the fallacy. So Spinoza, Hume and Sartre all seem to me to be real philosophers, on the grounds that for them this connexion between knowing and wanting seemed inevitable. My aim is to illustrate this kind of connexion by suggesting that the human imagination is such that we ought to value it and respect it more highly than anything else; and that therefore, if it can be educated and improved, it is to this education that we should give priority, if we are concerned with education at all. It may seem on the face of it absurd to say that we ought to value any particular human faculty or capacity. It may be thought that this is not the kind of object or evaluation with which at any rate philosophers should be concerned. But the fact is, of course, that we do value very highly indeed all kinds of capacities that we have, such as sight, and hearing and understanding. And being unashamedly naturalistic, I have no hesitation in saying not only that we do value them, but that we ought to; they are, in every sense, valuable. (shrink)

My topic may seem a bizarre mixture of epistemology and value theory; and perhaps it is best to acknowledge this oddity at once. I should also, perhaps, confess that such a mixture has always seemed something to aspire to. Any philosopher who has made it seem that feeling strongly about something, valuing it highly, is an inevitable consequence of the nature of human understanding, that from the facts of knowledge or perception one can derive the inescapable facts of emotion or (...) desire, any such philosopher has always deeply appealed to me. I am therefore a confessed perpetrator of the naturalistic fallacy. Indeed I go further, and say that I love the fallacy. So Spinoza, Hume and Sartre all seem to me to be real philosophers, on the grounds that for them this connexion between knowing and wanting seemed inevitable. My aim is to illustrate this kind of connexion by suggesting that the human imagination is such that we ought to value it and respect it more highly than anything else; and that therefore, if it can be educated and improved, it is to this education that we should give priority, if we are concerned with education at all. It may seem on the face of it absurd to say that we ought to value any particular human faculty or capacity. It may be thought that this is not the kind of object or evaluation with which at any rate philosophers should be concerned. But the fact is, of course, that we do value very highly indeed all kinds of capacities that we have, such as sight, and hearing and understanding. And being unashamedly naturalistic, I have no hesitation in saying not only that we do value them, but that we ought to; they are, in every sense, valuable. (shrink)

1. Conceptions of the nature of value are of two main types: they are either objective, or realistic, or else subjective, that is, psychological. The immediately following pages are devoted to the critical consideration of the first of these, the realistic conception of value as “an indefinable quality which attaches to things independently of consciousness.” According to this view, things have value as they have form or colour or volume. A rose, for example, has the qualities of redness, of (...) fragrance, and also of beauty; a book has the qualities of rectangularity, of twelve-ounce weight, and also of truth; a negro has the qualities of erectness, of brownness, and also of moral goodness or badness. Beauty, truth, and moral goodness, grouped together as ‘values,’ or ‘worths,’ or ‘goods,’ are from this point of view as indefinable and ‘absolute’ as the primary and secondary qualities: indeed, they are together known as “tertiary qualities.’ In G. E. Moore's words, a value or “ ‘good’ is a simple notion, just as ‘yellow’ is a simple notion”; and “just as you cannot, by any manner of means, explain to anyone who does not already know it what yellow is, so you cannot explain what good is.”. (shrink)

In einer stark männlich geprägten US-amerikanischen Politik trat Hillary Clinton 2016 als erste aussichtsreiche weibliche Präsidentschaftskandidatin an. Ihr Gegenkandidat Donald Trump nahm dies zum Anlass, im Wahlkampf wiederholt mit diffamierenden, oft sexistischen Kommentaren auf sich aufmerksam zu machen. Gender und konkret Hillary Clintons Feminität rückten damit in den Vordergrund des polarisierenden und feindseligen Wahlkampfes. Clinton stand in drei TV-Duellen ihrem Kontrahenten gegenüber und versuchte, die Bürger*innen von ihren Kompetenzen als Frau für das höchste politische Amt der USA zu überzeugen. Studien (...) zu Wahlverhalten zeigen, dass die Entscheidung der Wähler*innen am Tag der Wahl nicht bloß davon abhängt, welche Argumente und Positionen die Politiker*innen in den Debatten anführen und vertreten. TV-Duelle nehmen verstärkt eine zentrale Rolle für den Ausgang der Wahlen ein. Dieses Buch analysiert den Genderaspekt (konkret Clintons Feminität) in den drei TV-Debatten und untersucht, inwiefern Clintons Weiblichkeit von Trump als Nachteil dargestellt, von Clinton selbst jedoch als Vorteil genutzt wurde, um rhetorisch zu punkten. Hierzu werden die Debatten- und Kommunikationsstrategien der beiden Politiker*innen systematisch analysiert. Die Autorin Lisa Marie Simmack absolvierte ihren Master of Arts in Politikwissenschaft an der Leibniz Universität Hannover. Sie arbeitet als Journalistin im Norddeutschen Rundfunk im Landesfunkhaus Niedersachsen. (shrink)

This work “Escaping Self-Sacrifice: Changing Black Women’s Relationship with Servility” is a deep dive into Lisa Tessman’s Burdened Virtues. Addressing the idea of servility as a burdened virtue that requires self-sacrifice, I strive to reevaluate the traditional role Black women have in their families and within their communities. I argue that the demands of Black women are so excessive that they have lost touch with their self-regarding virtues, causing them to have ethical imbalances within themselves. This work is a part (...) of an ongoing attempt to counter oppressive practices with joy as a form of resistance. I use the idea that simply existing is enough for Black women without the added burden of taking care of everyone else. (shrink)

Das Handbuch Angewandte Ethik soll folgenden beiden Interessen Rechnung tragen: sowohl dem allgemeinen Informationsbedarf, beispielsweise von Journalisten, Politikern, Rechtswissenschaftlern und Fachleuten der jeweils betroffenen Disziplinen, als auch dem spezifischen der Kolleginnen und Kollegen, Studierenden und Lehrenden in der Angewandten Ethik. Entsprechend öffnen die neun Teile des Buches mehrere Zugangswege in das Handbuch. Nicht nur der Aufbau des Handbuchs ist mehrdimensional, auch die Beiträge stammen aus unterschiedlichen Bildungshintergründen und Arbeitskontexten. So wie die Angewandte Ethik durch die verschiedenen Fächer und Traditionen geprägt (...) ist, aus denen ihre Vertreterinnen und Vertreter stammen, so lassen auch die Kapitel dieses Handbuchs deutlich die persönliche Handschrift und Haltung der einzelnen Autorinnen und Autoren erkennen. Für die Leser:innen erschließt sich damit neben der inhaltlichen auch die soziokulturelle Vielschichtigkeit der modernen Angewandten Ethik. (shrink)

Jean-Marie Vaysse (1950-2011) hat das philosophische Leben in Frankreich durch die Originalität seines Nachdenkens über die Geschichte der Philosophie dauerhaft geprägt. Spinoza, Heidegger und Deleuze waren seine wichtigsten Weggefährten, mit denen er versucht hat, Fluchtlinien zu entwerfen, um über das Schicksal des zeitgenössischen Denkens nachzusinnen. Seine der deutschen Philosophie von Kant bis Heidegger gewidmete Lehre hat bei seinen Studenten an der Universität Toulouse II - Le Mirail eine sehr lebendige Erinnerung hinterlassen. Dieses Buch ehrt sein Werk, indem es (...) seine außergewöhnliche Art, philosophische Texte zu lesen, und seine Schärfe in der Analyse einiger bevorzugter Lehren hervorhebt und den Geist seiner Methode mit originalen Beiträgen fortführt. Außerdem werden zwei Texte postum veröffentlicht, die den Schwung eines nun abgebrochenen Denkens bezeugen. Jean-Marie Vaysse (1950-2011) a marqué durablement la vie philosophique française, par l’originalité de sa réflexion sur l’histoire de la philosophie. Spinoza, Heidegger et Deleuze ont constitué les principaux compagnons de route avec lesquels il s’est efforcé de dessiner des lignes de fuite pour méditer la destinée de la pensée contemporaine. Son enseignement à l’Université de Toulouse II-Le Mirail, consacré à la philosophie allemande, de Kant à Heidegger, a laissé un souvenir toujours vivant chez ses étudiants. Le présent volume rend hommage à son œuvre, en soulignant la singularité de sa pratique de lecture des textes philosophiques, l’acuité de son analyse de certaines doctrines privilégiées, et en perpétuant l’esprit de sa démarche par des contributions originales. Enfin, nous publions à titre posthume deux inédits, qui témoignent de l’élan d’une pensée interrompue. (shrink)

Through readings of works by Marivaux, Diderot, Rousseau, and Mary Shelley, David Marshall provides a new interpretation of the eighteenth-century preoccupation with theatricality and sympathy. Sympathy is seen not as an instance of sensibility or natural benevolence but rather as an aesthetic and epistemological problem that must be understood in relation to the problem of theatricality. Placing novels in the context of eighteenth-century writing about theater, fiction, and painting, Marshall argues that an unusual variety of authors and texts were concerned (...) with the possibility of entering into someone else's thoughts and feelings. He shows how key eighteenth-century works reflect on the problem of how to move, touch, and secure the sympathy of readers and beholders in the realm of both "art" and "life." Marshall discusses the demands placed upon novels to achieve certain effects, the ambivalence of writers and readers about those effects, and the ways in which these texts can be read as philosophical meditations on the differences and analogies between the experiences of reading a novel, watching a play, beholding a painting, and witnessing the spectacle of someone suffering. The Surprising Effects of Sympathy traces the interaction of sympathy and theater and the artistic and philosophical problems that these terms represent in dialogues about aesthetics, moral philosophy, epistemology, psychology, autobiography, the novel, and society. (shrink)

This paper explores Calkins’ absolute idealism and its ramifications for libertarian free will. Calkins’ metaphysics is a version of absolute idealism, according to which the absolute is a person who has everything else as either a part or an aspect. Three different arguments for the conclusion that Calkins’ metaphysics is incompatible with libertarian freewill are formulated and critically assessed. Finally, I assess the extent to which these arguments are independent of each other.

For over half a century I have been interested in the role of intuitive spatial reasoning in mathematics. My Oxford DPhil Thesis (1962) was an attempt to defend Kant's philosophy of mathematics, especially his claim that mathematical proofs extend our knowledge (so the knowledge is "synthetic", not "analytic") and that the discoveries are not empirical, or contingent, but are in an important sense "a priori" (which does not imply "innate") and also necessarily true. -/- I had made my views clear (...) in courses on philosophy of science and mathematics when teaching at Sussex University (from 1964) which was why one of our former students, Mary Pardoe (then Mary Ensor) who had become a mathematics teacher informed me, while visiting the university, that she had found a new diagrammatic proof of the triangle sum theorem. I reported her proof in some papers and presentations on methods of representation and reasoning, e.g. here, but neither she nor I has encountered anyone else who knew about the proof. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The African Novel of Ideas: Philosophy and Individualism in the Age of Global Writing by Jeanne-Marie JacksonAvram AlpertThe African Novel of Ideas: Philosophy and Individualism in the Age of Global Writing, by Jeanne-Marie Jackson; 232 pp. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2021.The world of postcolonial literary studies harbors a well-earned suspicion of claims to promoting liberal ideals like civility, rationality, and individuality. The liberal worldview, after all, (...) arose in the same era as European colonial expansion. To many critics, this was not a coincidence: liberal ideals were often crafted in opposition to the peoples that Europeans were encountering around the world. Whereas these other peoples were supposedly bound to collective myths, unaware of the primacy of the individual, and condemned to violent passions, liberals claimed that Europeans used rationality to perceive the value of individual life, and, in so doing, had unlocked the key to promoting civilizational harmony. All that everyone else had to do to experience this new way of life was, in one of history's most wretched paradoxes, to succumb to colonial violence and join the empire of liberty. It is thus quite logical that anticolonial criticism would call into question the basic features of the liberal worldview.But in recent years, an interdisciplinary cohort of scholars—including Sankar Muthu in political science, Sanjay Subrahmanyam in history, Mukti Lakhi Mangharam in literary studies, and Ato Sekyi-Otu in philosophy—have come to question this consensus.1 Their challenge rests on an ironic problem of the critique of ideologies associated with colonialism: by criticizing topics like civility, rationality, and individuality as such, do we not play into the very Eurocentric idea that these ideas were invented by Europeans in the first place? As these scholars have shown across various disciplines, geographies, and time periods, this critique risks giving modern Europe too much credit. Ideals often associated with liberalism have antecedents around the world. Sometimes they are used to advance general equality and well-being; sometimes they subvert these ideals. As Jeanne-Marie Jackson argues in her trenchant new book intervening in these debates, The African Novel of Ideas, we thus need a criticism that is as much attuned to the critique of "false universalisms" as it is open to "the promise of one that is true" (p. 189).Throughout her book, Jackson argues that a reconstructed liberalism is not only fundamental to literature from Africa but that the critical neglect of this fact has distorted the general understanding of literature today. Critics—especially but not exclusively in the West—have become so accustomed to sniffing out hints of liberal, individualist ideology that they routinely cast aside the ways in which African philosophers and novelists have themselves sought to explore and transform these ideals. Jackson's argument is not that liberalism, as it stands, is a noble philosophy that has been unfairly jettisoned. Rather, she posits that African writers are developing a fundamental innovation by considering how they—who were so long exploited by European ideals—can nonetheless find [End Page 495] meaning in both alternative and emergent versions of these very same ideals. What their work emphasizes is the "process of getting from an African locality to its universal resonance" (p. 185). In other words, whereas Europeans had simply presumed that their view of the world should apply everywhere, the contemporary novelists and philosophers discussed in this book engage in thorough intellectual and conceptual labor to tease out how ideas generated in one place might speak (without force) to peoples around the world.Jackson advances this argument through an innovative mix of philosophy and literature. Rather than evoking the standard series of French philosophers summoned to explicate literature, Jackson frames her readings through the work of philosophers such as Kwasi Wiredu, Kwame Anthony Appiah, and Emmanuel Eze. This allows her to shift the focus of her readings of literature from questions of language and close reading to underanalyzed topics in philosophy and literature, especially about how African literature enacts philosophical questions. She discusses topics ranging from the nature of the self and the meaning of rationality to a meta-interrogation on the purpose of philosophizing itself (pp. 16–17). That purpose... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The African Novel of Ideas: Philosophy and Individualism in the Age of Global Writing by Jeanne-Marie JacksonAvram AlpertThe African Novel of Ideas: Philosophy and Individualism in the Age of Global Writing, by Jeanne-Marie Jackson; 232 pp. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2021.The world of postcolonial literary studies harbors a well-earned suspicion of claims to promoting liberal ideals like civility, rationality, and individuality. The liberal worldview, after all, (...) arose in the same era as European colonial expansion. To many critics, this was not a coincidence: liberal ideals were often crafted in opposition to the peoples that Europeans were encountering around the world. Whereas these other peoples were supposedly bound to collective myths, unaware of the primacy of the individual, and condemned to violent passions, liberals claimed that Europeans used rationality to perceive the value of individual life, and, in so doing, had unlocked the key to promoting civilizational harmony. All that everyone else had to do to experience this new way of life was, in one of history's most wretched paradoxes, to succumb to colonial violence and join the empire of liberty. It is thus quite logical that anticolonial criticism would call into question the basic features of the liberal worldview.But in recent years, an interdisciplinary cohort of scholars—including Sankar Muthu in political science, Sanjay Subrahmanyam in history, Mukti Lakhi Mangharam in literary studies, and Ato Sekyi-Otu in philosophy—have come to question this consensus.1 Their challenge rests on an ironic problem of the critique of ideologies associated with colonialism: by criticizing topics like civility, rationality, and individuality as such, do we not play into the very Eurocentric idea that these ideas were invented by Europeans in the first place? As these scholars have shown across various disciplines, geographies, and time periods, this critique risks giving modern Europe too much credit. Ideals often associated with liberalism have antecedents around the world. Sometimes they are used to advance general equality and well-being; sometimes they subvert these ideals. As Jeanne-Marie Jackson argues in her trenchant new book intervening in these debates, The African Novel of Ideas, we thus need a criticism that is as much attuned to the critique of "false universalisms" as it is open to "the promise of one that is true" (p. 189).Throughout her book, Jackson argues that a reconstructed liberalism is not only fundamental to literature from Africa but that the critical neglect of this fact has distorted the general understanding of literature today. Critics—especially but not exclusively in the West—have become so accustomed to sniffing out hints of liberal, individualist ideology that they routinely cast aside the ways in which African philosophers and novelists have themselves sought to explore and transform these ideals. Jackson's argument is not that liberalism, as it stands, is a noble philosophy that has been unfairly jettisoned. Rather, she posits that African writers are developing a fundamental innovation by considering how they—who were so long exploited by European ideals—can nonetheless find [End Page 495] meaning in both alternative and emergent versions of these very same ideals. What their work emphasizes is the "process of getting from an African locality to its universal resonance" (p. 185). In other words, whereas Europeans had simply presumed that their view of the world should apply everywhere, the contemporary novelists and philosophers discussed in this book engage in thorough intellectual and conceptual labor to tease out how ideas generated in one place might speak (without force) to peoples around the world.Jackson advances this argument through an innovative mix of philosophy and literature. Rather than evoking the standard series of French philosophers summoned to explicate literature, Jackson frames her readings through the work of philosophers such as Kwasi Wiredu, Kwame Anthony Appiah, and Emmanuel Eze. This allows her to shift the focus of her readings of literature from questions of language and close reading to underanalyzed topics in philosophy and literature, especially about how African literature enacts philosophical questions. She discusses topics ranging from the nature of the self and the meaning of rationality to a meta-interrogation on the purpose of philosophizing itself (pp. 16–17). That purpose... (shrink)

Divya is a surrogate mother from India. Aaliyah, an African-American teenager, has just terminated her pregnancy. Samantha, on the other hand, is childless and looking for ways to adopt. What connects these three women? Other than being sites for reproduction, one tends to think nothing else brings them together. This fantastic book shows us otherwise by revealing the interconnection of three reproductive lifecycles through neoliberalism and its biopolitical impact on their "choices". Modhumita Roy and Mary Thompson have thematically married (...) twelve impactful and unique essays that bring the stories of actual and fictional women to life.To understand how the... (shrink)

Review of ELSE MARIE BUKDAHL, JOHANNES WIEDEWELT – TRADITION OG NYBRUD [JOHANNES WIEDEWELT – TRADITION AND BREAKTHROUGH] COPENHAGEN: U PRESS, 2021. 148 PAGES ISBN: 9788793890121.

Back cover: This book develops a philosophical account that reveals the major characteristics that make an explanation in the life sciences reductive and distinguish them from non-reductive explanations. Understanding what reductive explanations are enables one to assess the conditions under which reductive explanations are adequate and thus enhances debates about explanatory reductionism. The account of reductive explanation presented in this book has three major characteristics. First, it emerges from a critical reconstruction of the explanatory practice of the life sciences itself. (...) Second, the account is monistic since it specifies one set of criteria that apply to explanations in the life sciences in general. Finally, the account is ontic in that it traces the reductivity of an explanation back to certain relations that exist between objects in the world (such as part-whole relations and level relations), rather than to the logical relations between sentences. Beginning with a disclosure of the meta-philosophical assumptions that underlie the author’s analysis of reductive explanation, the book leads into the debate about reduction(ism) in the philosophy of biology and continues with a discussion on the two perspectives on explanatory reduction that have been proposed in the philosophy of biology so far. The author scrutinizes how the issue of reduction becomes entangled with explanation and analyzes two concepts, the concept of a biological part and the concept of a level of organization. The results of these five chapters constitute the ground on which the author bases her final chapter, developing her ontic account of reductive explanation. (shrink)

Kaum ein Buch hat so viele und so kontroverse Reaktionen verursacht wie Simone de Beauvoirs "Das Andere Geschlecht". Der Sammelband gibt einen Einblick in die aktuelle internationale Beauvoir-Debatte und die Art und Weise wie das fünfzigjährige Jubiläum des "Anderen Geschlechts" gefeiert wurde. Die Autorinnen versuchen die verschiedenen Grundthemen von Beauvoirs Werk, wie Geschlecht und Körper (D. Lamoureux, M. Couillard, M. L. Femenías), Gleichheit und Differenz (S. Kruks, Y. Raynova, S. Bainbrigge), Ausschluss und Anerkennung (D. Bergoffen, S. Moser), Verantwortung und (...) Engagement (F. Rétif, N. Bauer, K. Arp, Dauphin, C. Gater), aus der Perspektive der Gegenwart neu zu beleuchten. Darüber hinaus enthält der Band biographische (K. Vintges, B. Weisshaupt) und bibliographische Beiträge, die ihn zu einem Nachschlagewerk und zu einer Dokumentation der gegenwärtigen Beauvoirforschung werden lassen. Aus dem Inhalt: Françoise Rétif: Zur Aktualität von Simone de Beauvoir oder die Dialektik des Engagements - Nancy Bauer: First Philosophy, "The Second Sex", and the Third Wave - Debra Bergoffen: Simone de Beauvoir and Jean-Paul Sartre: Woman, Man and the Desire to be God - Elaine Stavro-Pearce: Transgressing Sartre: embodied situated subjects in "The Second Sex" - Susanne Moser: Subjekt und Anerkennung: Zum Problem des Ausschlusses von Frauen und Weiblichkeit im" Anderen Geschlecht" - Diane Lamoureux: Der Paradox des Körpers bei Simone de Beauvoir - Marie Couillard: Die Lesbierin bei Simone de Beauvoir und Nicole Brossard - María Luisa Femenías: Beauvoir revisited: Butler and the "gender" question - Sonia Kruks: Panopticism and Shame: Reading Foucault through Beauvoir - Yvanka B. Raynova: Für eine postmoderne Ethik der Gerechtigkeit: Simone de Beauvoir und Jean-François Lyotard - Kristana Arp: Moral obligation in Simone de Beauvoir's "The Ethics of Ambiguity" - Susan Bainbrigge: The Impact of Simone de Beauvoir's "universel singularisé" on the Politics of Representation and the Representation of Politics - Sandrine Dauphin: From Socialism to radical Feminism: Militant foundations in Simone de Beauvoir's Writings - Claudia Gather: Simone de Beauvoir, eine Klassikerin der feministischen Soziologie? - Karen Vintges: Beauvoir's autobiography: "autofiction" or selftechnique? - Brigitte Weisshaupt: Simone de Beauvoir und Jean-Paul Sartre. Eine Anmerkung - Susanne Moser/Yvanka B. Raynova: "50 Jahre 'Das andere Geschlecht'": Zur internationalen Konferenz in Paris (19.-23.01.1999). (shrink)

Le discours psychiatrique s’établit au XIXe siècle par un corps médical qui reproduit des relations de pouvoir : dans le cas de l’hystérie, le corps médical (majoritairement masculin) impose un discours de vérité sur un corps féminin qui est celui de la patiente. C’est la dimension genrée de ce phénomène que nous chercherons à clarifier en ce qui a trait aux relations de pouvoir, en avançant la thèse que les hystériques se dressent comme figure de résistance devant le pouvoir psychiatrique (...) – cette résistance étant rendue possible par la réappropriation d’une parole dérobée dans la production d’un discours de vérité. Pour ce faire, nous présenterons en premier lieu les démarches de Charcot, puis de Freud et Breuer dans les études sur l’hystérie. Nous emprunterons ensuite le cadre conceptuel foucaldien pour analyser les relations de pouvoir qui se trouvent au cœur de ces deux exemples, et nous tenterons finalement de montrer comment les hystériques peuvent être vues comme « militantes », à partir d’une perspective critique et féministe. (shrink)

Healthcare providers have been central actors in containing the COVID-19 pandemic. Although potentially very beneficial, the implementation of large-scale rapid serological tests raises ethical dilemmas and affects HCPs’ capacity to work in optimal conditions. In this regard, we call for attention to address specific and urgent ethical issues distinctively affecting HCPs following the availability and possible mandatory use of rapid serological tests for COVID-19.

The book is about logical analysis of natural language. Since we humans communicate by means of natural language, we need a tool that helps us to understand in a precise manner how the logical and formal mechanisms of natural language work. Moreover, in the age of computers, we need to communicate both with and through computers as well. Transparent Intensional Logic is a tool that is helpful in making our communication and reasoning smooth and precise. It deals with all kinds (...) of linguistic context in a fully compositional and anti-contextual way. (shrink)

Above all else, Hegel can be said to be the master of context, the philosopher who insisted that properly understanding anything involves putting it in its full context, reconstructing its development and its relation to all that is around it. From the beginning of his career, Hegel did not hesitate to put into its place the work of his fellow philosophers; his analysis, critique, and supersession of them occurred all at once, and culminated when he located them within hisPhenomenology (...) of Spiritand the final system of hisEncyclopedia. Long after Hegel's own era, and even after the sharp decline in the appeal of his specific system and of ambitious systematic philosophy in general, a looser form of Hegel's contextual approach remains very popular, and with good reason. Without giving in entirely to this approach, it is hard to resist the temptation to turn the tables on Hegel himself a bit. Hence, in casting a philosophical glance at the specific phenomenon of Hegel's own aesthetics, in an attempt to begin to evaluate just a few of its most distinctive characteristics, I will proceed by first offering a sketch of how I believe his philosophy as a whole should be situated in the context of its own age and the development of German philosophy in general.Of course, my own interpretive perspective has its own context, external and internal. The external context is furnished by two other accounts providing slants on Hegel's aesthetics, slants that I believe are very understandable but in the end inadequate. The first of these slants is given by what I will call the “standard account,” which buys into most of Hegel's own characterization of his aesthetics as largely a welcome “objective” corrective to the supposedly “subjective” approach of Kant and the allegedly even more radically “subjectivistic” and arbitrary approach of the German Romantics. The second slant is to be found in Jean-Marie Schaeffer's recent book,Art of the Modern Age: Philosophy of Art from Kant to Heidegger. Schaeffer accepts much of the standard account, but he goes on to argue in an original way that the main aesthetic tradition of Germany — after Kant, from the early Romantics to Hegel and others until Heidegger — shares a large set of influential and highly questionable “speculative” presumptions, and that the sharing of this speculative approach is far more significant — and unfortunate — than whatever incidental differences can be found between various figures within this tradition. (shrink)